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Abstract
A wide variety of social protection systems coexist within the EU. Some member states
provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal and more or
less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian (with benefits
related to past contributions). Labor mobility raises concerns about the sustainability
of the most generous and redistributive (Beveridgean) insurance systems. We address
this issue in a two-country setting, where individuals differ in mobility cost (attachment
to their native country). A Bismarckian insurance system is not affected by migration
while a Beveridgean one is. Our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting
tax rates may be more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under
Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Finally, we study the strategic choice of the type of
social protection. We show that Bismarckian governments may find it beneficial to
adopt a Beveridgean insurance system.
JEL classification: H23;H70
Keywords: Social insurance; Tax competition; Mobility; Economic Integration
1 Introduction
The European Commission has designated 2006 as the European year of workers’ mo-
bility. Even though, labor mobility within Europe currently remains admittedly rather
small, it is expected to gain importance in the years to come. European authorities as
well as many politicians are advocating it, arguing that “job mobility is one of the cru-
cial factors in Europe’s economic success” (Špidla, 2006). Moreover, younger people are
the most mobile, with 5% of the age groups 25—34 having moved at least once across EU
countries. Finally, the 2004 EU enlargement permitted (or will permit after a transition
period) the migration of potentially more mobile citizens. According to some estimates,
5% the new member states’ nationals are expected to migrate to another EU country
within the next five years (Vandenbrande et al., 2006).
Mobility across countries affects the coexistence of different social insurance systems.
Currently, one can find a wide variety of welfare systems in the EU countries. Some
member states provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal
and more or less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian
(with benefits related to past contributions). Since social contributions (payroll taxes)
are related to individual incomes, Beveridgean systems imply a higher degree of income
redistribution than Bismarckian schemes. Increased mobility raises concerns about the
sustainability of the most generous and redistributive systems. This is because one
can expect these countries to attract the lowest incomes and the highest risks and to
repeal the highest incomes and the lowest risks (Sinn, 1990). Consequently, the extent
of redistribution and the size of benefits is expected to decrease as workers become more
mobile.
This paper examines the sustainability of redistributive social insurance systems un-
der labor mobility in a two country setting. The novelty of our approach is threefold.
First, we introduce migration costs in the analysis in view of getting more realistic inte-
rior solutions instead of the bang-bang solution where all individuals of the same type
locate in a single country. While this assumption is commonly used in the tax com-
petition literature (see, e.g., Hindriks, 1999 and Leite-Monteiro, 1997) migration costs
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are typically ignored in social competition models.1 Second, governments strategically
choose both the type (Beveridge versus Bismarck), and the generosity of their social
protection system. Third, in specifying a governments preferences we explicitly distin-
guish between the concern for redistribution and the concern for insurance. To be more
precise, a Beveridgean government will maximize a welfare function that values both
redistribution and insurance. A Bismarckian government, on the other hand, only cares
about the provision of insurance. We determine the equilibria for different combina-
tions of the two governments’ prefererences (Bismarck-Bismarck, Beveridge-Beveridge
and Beveridge-Bismarck).
The issue of tax competition under factor mobility has been extensively studied (see
Cremer and Pestieau, 2004, for a survey). However, the implication of mobility for the
sustainability of social protection has received much less attention and many questions
remain open. There are three papers closely related to ours. In a two-country setting,
Cremer and Pestieau (1998) study the strategic interaction between benevolent social
planners regarding the choice of the type of social insurance system. They suppose
a three-stage decision process where in the first stage, the constitutional stage, social
planners choose the degree of redistribution of social insurance (the Bismarckian factor).
At the second stage native individuals decide through majority voting on the level
of payroll taxes which, in turn, determine the level of benefits. At the third stage
individuals decide upon migration. Cremer and Pestieau show that if rich individuals are
mobile they end up all living in the same country. This implies that one of the countries
would insure but not redistribute. Another result is that when countries adopt the
same level of redistribution, the level of benefits (emerging from the voting process) is
larger the less redistributive (more Bismarckian) is the social insurance system. Finally,
at stage one the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., the planners choose the same level of
redistribution. Consequently, all countries would end up with the same Bismarckian
factor in contrast to what we observe in reality.
To fill this gap, Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and more recently Rossignol and Tau-
gourdeau (2006) have analyzed social insurance competition between asymmetric sys-
1The single exception we are aware of, Rossignol and Taugourdeau (2006), is discussed below.
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tems, i.e., Bismarckian and Beveridgean schemes. Cremer and Pestieau (2003) assume
that decisions are taken in two stages: the benevolent social planner decides upon the
level of benefits, anticipating the migration flows of the second stage.2 When only the
poor face a risk, all poor may end up migrating towards the Bismarckian country. This
happens to be the case when income differences are sufficiently small so that the Bev-
eridgean planner prefers not to supply any insurance (which would hurt the rich), but
instead induce the migration of the poor towards the Bismarckian country where they
can get actuarially fair insurance. Cremer and Pestieau (1998 and 2003) obtain solu-
tions with all individuals of the same income class migrating towards the same country
because of the absence of migration costs. Rossignol and Taugourdeau (2006) intro-
duce migration costs in an asymmetric (Bismarck versus Beveridge) social insurance
competition setting with several income groups. They study the political choice of the
size of social insurance benefits (according to a citizen candidate procedure) when one
country offers Bismarckian and the other Beveridgean insurance. They show that the
lowest incomes tend to be attracted towards the Beveridgean country and the highest
incomes towards the Bismarckian country but that the extent of migration depends on
expatriation costs.
Some other papers have also studied the sustainability of social insurance under
labor mobility. As Cremer and Pestieau (2003), Lejour and Verbon (1994) also obtain
the result that the impact of economic integration on social insurance depends very
much on the type of mobility considered. However, they assume high-risk and low-risk
individuals rather then high-income and low-income individuals. Bureau and Richard
(1997) get an similar result.3
In this paper we consider a two country setting where individuals are endowed with
either low or high income and may face the risk of loosing it. They are born in one of the
countries, and can choose their country of residence. However they have a preference for
2A countries welfare depends on the utilities of its natives (irrespectively of their countiry of resi-
dence).
3Another line of research has dealt with the effect of social insurance incentives on human capital
investment. Poutvaara (2007) obtains the result that labor mobility increases investments in human cap-
ital in the Beveridgean country but reduces that of migrants from Bismarkian towards the Beveridgean
country.
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living in their home country (Leite-Monteiro, 1997 and Hindriks, 1999). This preference
for the home country implies that the migration process is a continuous function of the
countries’ policies. It avoids the discontinuous (and obviously unrealistic) process that
occurs in Cremer and Pestieau (1998, 2003) under which a small variation in tax rates
can induce an entire income group to move from one country to the other.4 National
governments maximize a welfare function which depends on the utility of its natives (as
opposed to its residents).
Through most of the paper (up to Section 6), we assume that a country’s type
of social insurance system (Bismarckian or a Beveridgean) is given (and reflects the
preferences of the national government). The timing of the game is as follows. In a
first stage governments choose the level of payroll taxes, (defining the generosity of the
system). Knowing the type and size of the systems, individuals choose their country
of residence. Governments care for their natives only and when setting the payroll tax
they anticipate the migration equilibrium. We will consider three scenarios. In the
first scenario both countries adopt a Beveridgean social policy, while both countries are
Bismarckian in the second one. Finally, we consider an asymmetric setting in which one
of the countries adopts a Beveridgean policy and the other a Bismarckian policy. In
each case we determine the Nash equilibrium of this social insurance competition game.
An important contribution of our paper is that we justify the adoption of different
types of system by considering different types of governments’ preferences. Specifically,
governments may care for both redistribution and insurance or for insurance only. In
the first part of the paper we assume that the system in place and the governments
preferences go hand in hand. Finally, we drop this assumption and allow governments
to choose the type of system to be adopted in their respective countries in a strategic
way. Not surprisingly, our results suggest that when both governments have identical
preferences, they choose the social insurance system associated with their type. How-
ever, a more interesting and surprising outcome emerges in the asymmetric case where
one government has Beveridgean preferences and the other Bismarckian ones. In this
case the Nash equilibrium implies that both players choose a Beveridgean insurance
4This discontinuous adjustment in turn explains the bang-bang solution obtained in these papers.
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policy.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3
characterizes the solution under autarky which constitutes our benchmark. In Section
4.1 we characterize the tax competition among Bismarckian governments, in Section
4.2 between Beveridgean governments and in Section 4.3 we consider an asymmetric
setting with a Beveridgean and a Bismarckian government. In Section 5 we provide
numerical examples which illustrate our theoretical results and provide further insights
for the cases where analytical results are ambiguous. Section 6 considers the strategical
choice of the type of system.
2 Setup
There are two countries, indexed by A and B. Individuals differ in their wage, wi, with
i = L,H and wL < wH . Labor supply is inelastic and normalized at one so that wi also
represents exogenous income. The size of high-income (also referred to as “rich”) and
low-income (also referred to as “poor”) populations are each set at one. Individuals also
differ with respect to their preference for living in a country. Their taste is captured by
the parameter x ∈ [0, 1] (Monsoorian and Myers, 1993, and Hindriks, 1999), uniformly
distributed over [0, 1] for both high- and low-income individuals. Preferences of an
individual i, who lives in country A or B are respectively defined by
UAi = ln
£
wAi
¤
+ 1− x (1)
UBi = ln
£
wBi
¤
+ x, (2)
where wji , is the individual’s disposable income when residing in country j = A,B.
Country A’s natives are individuals with a taste parameter x ≤ 1/2 and country B’s
natives those with a taste parameter x > 1/2. Consequently both countries have a
native population of 1, equally composed of low- and high-income individuals. Figure
1 illustrates native population of each country. Rich and poor individuals are located
along a line with dimension one and those located from 0 to 1/2 are natives of country
A whereas the others are natives of country B.
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Figure 1: Native population of countries A and B.
For the ease of exposition we suppose for the time being that only low-income
individuals face the risk of loosing their income with a probability of 1/2. In Section 5 we
shall relax this assumption and suppose that all individuals face the risk of loosing their
income. National governments provide social insurance, which gives poor individuals
a benefit in the bad state of nature (when they loose their earning ability). Social
insurance is financed by taxes, with the tax base depending on the type of system.
When the system is Bismarckian, there is no redistribution and benefits to the low-
income individuals are financed by taxes levied on low-income individuals only. Under
a Beveridgean system, on the other hand, the benefits to the low income individuals are
financed by a proportional tax levied on both income classes at a uniform rate.
We assume, for the time being, that the system which is adopted and the prefer-
ences of the respective government go hand in hand. In other words, a Bismarckian
government implements a Bismarckian system, while a Beveridgean government selects
a Beveridgean system. Governments are labeled according to their preferences, which
may or may not reflect a concern for redistribution.5
We adopt a specification of social welfare which explicitly distinguishes between re-
distribution across income classes and the provision of insurance (which can be thought
about as redistribution between states of nature). To do so, define the certainty equiv-
5This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.
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alent of a low-income individual, CEjL, who lives in country j = A,B, as
ln
h
CEjL
i
=
1
2
ln
h
wL(1− tjL)
i
+
1
2
ln
£
bj
¤
CEjL =
³
wL(1− tjL)b
j
´1/2
, (3)
where tjL is the tax rate for low income individuals in country j, and b
j the benefit they
receive in case of income loss. High income individuals do not face any uncertainty, and
their certainty equivalent is simply given by
CEjH = wH(1− t
j
H), (4)
where tjH is the tax rate applied to rich individuals in country j. For simplicity, we
concentrate at this point on the case where no migration occurs, so that there is no
need to distinguish between residents and natives. Preferences of country A’s and B’s
governments are respectively given by
SWFA =
Z 1/2
0
(CEAL )
1−ρA − 1
1− ρA +
(CEAH)
1−ρA − 1
1− ρA dx+ 2
Z 1/2
0
(1− x) dx, (5)
SWFB =
Z 1
1/2
(CEBL )
1−ρB − 1
1− ρB +
(CEBH)
1−ρB − 1
1− ρB dx+ 2
Z 1
1/2
x dx, (6)
where ρj ≥ 0 represents the government’s “preference for redistribution”. When ρj = 0,
redistribution across income groups does not provide any social benefits (while insurance
does). At the other extreme, ρj → ∞ yields a Rawlsian social welfare function. The
last term on the RHS of both expressions accounts for low and high income individuals’
utility for living in the home country.
We consider two specifications of social preferences. The first assumes ρj = 0 and
reflects the absence of income redistribution concern characteristic of Bismarckian coun-
tries. The second assumes ρj = 1, reflecting some income redistribution concern charac-
teristic of Beveridgean countries (and being conveniently simplified to logarithmic). To
sum up government A’s preferences are given by either of the following two expressions
SWFA =
Z 1/2
0
ln(CEAL ) + ln(CE
A
H)dx+ 2
Z 1/2
0
(1− x) dx, if ρA = 1 (7)
SWFA =
Z 1/2
0
(CEAL − 1) + (CEAH − 1)dx+ 2
Z 1/2
0
(1− x) dx, if ρA = 0, (8)
7
with analogous expressions applying for government B.6 Observe that expression (7) can
also be interpreted as a simple utilitarian welfare function (sum of individual utilities)
defined without the detour of certainty equivalents. When mobility and the possibility of
tax competition are introduced, three different cases can arise: (i) Both countries have
Bismarckian type of preferences (insurance concerns only, with ρA = 0, and ρB = 0);
(ii) Both countries have Beveridgean type of preferences (insurance and redistribution
concerns, with ρA = 1, and ρB = 1); and (iii) Government A has Beveridgean type of
preferences while Planner B has Bismarckian ones (ρA = 1 and ρB = 0).
3 Autarky
To have a benchmark we first look at the optimal choices of Bismarckian and Bev-
eridgean governments when migration is not possible. We adopt the perspective of
country A, but similar results are easily obtained for country B.
In the case of a Bismarckian system, the poor individuals insure among themselves,
while rich individuals do not contribute (tAH = 0). This means that the only implicit
redistribution is within the class of low income individuals, from those in the good state
of nature (no income loss) towards those in the bad one (income loss). With a loss
probability of 1/2, budget-balancing benefits are given by
bA = wLtAL . (9)
Substituting (9) into (3) and simplifying yields
CEAL = wL(1− tAL)tAL ,
while tAH = 0 implies CE
A
H = wH . Substituting into (8) and rearranging we obtain
SWFA =
1
2
[wL(1− tAL)tAL + wH − 1] + 2
Z 0.5
0
(1− x) dx. (10)
Maximizing this expression with respect to tAL
tBISL =
1
2
. (11)
6Both of these expression are valide under autharky; they may have to be amended once mobility is
introduced.
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This result does not come as a surprise: under autarky, the Bismarckian planner provides
full insurance at the actuarially fair price.7
Turning to the Beveridgean government, it provides insurance to the low income
individuals financed by a tax levied on both income classes at a uniform rate tAL = t
A
H =
tA. The government’s budget constraint requires
1
4
bA =
1
4
wLtA +
1
2
wHtA,
so that benefits are given by
bA = (wL + 2wH) tA.
Using this condition along with equation (7) the Beveridgean government’s welfare
function can be rewritten as
SWFA =
1
4
ln
£
wL(1− tA)
¤
+
1
4
ln
£
(wL + 2wH) tA
¤
+
1
2
ln(wH(1−tA))dx+2
Z 1/2
0
(1−x) dx.
Maximizing this expression with respect to tA yields the solution t
BEV
= 1/4.
4 Migration of low-income individuals
We now introduce the possibility that the poor may migrate to the other country. The
timing is the following. At Stage 1 both governments simultaneously choose taxes.
Then, at Stage 2 low income individuals choose their country of residence. Finally, at
Stage 3 the state of nature is realized for poor individuals (who may or may not loose
their earning ability).
We suppose that a country’s type of system (Beveridgean or Bismarckian) is given
and determined by its government’s preferences. Low income individuals’ migration flows
are defined with respect to native populations. Consequently, as long as there is some
migration flow, the low income resident populations differ from the native ones. This
affects both the budget constraint and the welfare functions. Although governments
only care about their natives they supply social insurance to all their residents. On
7This property holds for any (strictly) concave utility function (and not just the logarithmic specifi-
cation).
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the other hand, governments do care also for their natives who are living abroad and
subjected to other social insurance systems.
Let bxL ∈ [0, 1] denote the index of the marginal individual, who is indifferent between
living in country A or in country B. It is defined as solution to
1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tAL)
¤
+
1
2
ln
£
bA
¤
+ (1− bxL) = 1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tBL )
¤
+
1
2
ln
£
bB
¤
+ bxL, (12)
if such a solution exists. Poor individuals with a taste parameter lower than bxL decide
to live in country A. When (12) has no solution (in the interval [0, 1]) we set bxL = 1
when UAL > U
B
L for all x ∈ [0, 1] and bxL = 0 in the opposite case. Throughout the paper
we concentrate on the case where bxL is interior. This is necessarily true in a symmetric
equilibrium, but it may or may not be true in asymmetric settings. Still, we focus
precisely on interior solutions as bang-bang solutions, with all individuals migrating
towards a same country, have already been addressed in the literature (see for instances
Cremer and Pestieau, 2003).
We now study how the possibility of migration affects competition among different
types of insurance systems.
4.1 Bismarck Bismarck tax competition
Recall that when migration is not possible, Bismarckian governments tax their low
income individuals at a rate of 1/2, providing them with full insurance. Under migration
a government’s policy choice affects the residential decision of both countries’ natives.
To study a symmetric equilibrium we focus on country A’s perspective and assume
without loss of generality that bxL ≥ 1/2.8 The budget constraint is
1
2
bxLbA = 1
2
bxLwLtAL . (13)
As long as bxL > 0 this condition simplifies to
bA = wLtAL , (14)
8To avoid a tedious exposition, and anticipating the migration equilibrium, we focus on exL ≥ 1/2,
but the analogous exercise can be done to exL < 1/2.
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which is exactly identical to (9), the Bismarckian budget constraint under autarky. This
does not come as a surprise. As low income residents insure among themselves (pay
an actuarially fair rate), migration does not affect the budget constraint of the social
insurance system. Furthermore, for bxL > 1/2 government A’s welfare function continues
to be given by
SWFA =
Z 0.5
0
(CEAL − 1) + (CEAH − 1)dx+ 2
Z 0.5
0
(1− x) dx, (15)
which is the same as under autarky, because no native of country A has migrated
to the other country. Substituting for CEAL and CE
A
H from equations (3) and (4),
and using the budget constraint it is then plain that we return to equation (10), the
expression of welfare under autarky. Consequently we obtain the same solution, namely
tAL = t
B
L = t
BISBIS
L = 1/2, (where the subscript BISBIS stands for country A’s and
country B’s type of insurance policy, respectively, Bismarckian and Bismarckian). Since
tAL = t
B
L , there is no migration in equilibrium (bxL = 1/2).
4.2 Beveridge Beveridge Tax Competition
We now examine how migration affects Beveridge Beveridge tax competition. Each
government charges the same tax rate to all its residents, so that tAL = t
A
H = t
A, and
tBL = t
B
H = t
B. As before we focus on government A with bxL ≥ 1/2. In contrast to the
Bismarck Bismarck competition case, migration now affects the budget constraint
1
2
bxLbA = 1
2
bxLwLtA + 1
2
wHtA, (16)
and benefits are now given by
bA =
µ
wL +
wHbxL
¶
tA. (17)
Note surprisingly, for a given tax rate, the level of benefits in country A decreases as
the size of the poor population increases (as bxL raises). Substituting (17) into (12), the
definition of bxL, yields
1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tA)
¤
+
1
2
ln
∙µ
wL +
wHbxL
¶
tA
¸
+ (1− bxL) =
1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tB)
¤
+
1
2
ln
∙µ
wL +
wH
1− bxL
¶
tB
¸
+ bxL. (18)
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Totally differentiating this expression and rearranging, we obtain
∂bxL
∂tA
=
1
tA −
1
(1−tA)
4 + wH
wL+
wH
1−exL

(1−exL)2
+ wH
wL+
wH
exL

ex2L
, (19)
which is positive provided that tA < 1/2. It can be checked that tA = 1/2 corresponds
to the poor individual preferred level for tA.9 In words, the size of the low-income
population increases with the tax rate as long as it is below the individual preferred
level. Conversely, when a country cuts its tax rate, it will incite some of its poor residents
to move to the other country. For future reference, note that when tA = tB, we havebxL = 1/2 and expression (19) simplifies to
∂bxL
∂tA
=
1
tA
− 1(1−tA)
4 + 4wHwL+2wH
. (20)
Using the budget constraint, welfare of the Beveridgean government A (for bxL ≥ 1/2),
defined by equation (7), can be expressed as follows
SWFA =
1
4
ln
£
wL(1− tA)
¤
+
1
4
ln
∙µ
wL +
wHbxL(tA, tB)
¶
tA
¸
+
1
2
ln
£
wH(1− tA)
¤
+ 2
0.5Z
0
(1− x)dx. (21)
To understand this expression, recall that with bxL ≥ 1/2 all natives of country A live
in country A. The first term on the RHS concerns the poor who do not experience an
income loss, while the second term accounts for the poor who suffer an income loss (and
receive social benefits). The third term represents the utility of consumption of the rich
whereas the last terms measures the utility from living in country A, derived through
the taste parameter x.
Differentiating welfare with respect to tA yields the following FOC
FBEV BEV =
−3
4(1− tA) +
1
4tA
+
wH
4(wL + wHexL )
−∂bxL/∂tAbx2L = 0. (22)
9Because of the redistribution implied by the Beveridgean policy the price to be paid for insurance is
below the actuarial fair price. Consequently, the poor individual’s preferred value for tA is higher than
under and actuarially fair system.
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Using (20), setting t = tA = tB and bxL = 1/2, and solving shows that in a symmetric
equilibrium the tax rate is given by
tBEV BEV =
1
4
µ
4wH + 2wL
5wH + 2wL
¶
<
1
4
. (23)
To interpret this result, recall that the tax rate under autarky is equal to 1/4; see Section
3 . In the Beveridgean case, migration and the induced tax competition thus results in
a lower tax rate and a reduced level of social insurance. Not surprisingly, this result
obtains even when there is effectively no migration in equilibrium, and it is in sharp
contrast to the outcome of Bismarckian systems. Observe that tBEVBEV is decreasing
in wH so that a larger income difference leads to a lower equilibrium tax rate.
Summing up our results for the symmetric cases, we show that tax competition
represents no threat to Bismarckian systems, while it leads to a lower (but positive)
level of social protection with Beveridgean systems. These results are quite in line
with conventional wisdom but they are of limited interest for practical policy issues
because they only concern symmetric settings. The most interesting issues arise for the
asymmetric cases to which we now turn.
4.3 Beveridge Bismarck Tax Competition
Suppose now that country A is Beveridgean while country B is Bismarckian. Benefits in
country A continue to be given by equation (17) and those in country B are determined
by
bB = wLtBL , (24)
which is the counterpart to equation (14). The marginal individual, bxL, is then deter-
mined by the condition
1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tA)
¤
+
1
2
ln
∙µ
wL +
wHbxL
¶
tA
¸
+ (1− bxL) =
1
2
ln
£
wL(1− tB)
¤
+
1
2
ln
£
wLtB
¤
+ bxL, (25)
stating that he enjoys the same utility in both countries.
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Differentiating this expression, we obtain
∂bxL
∂tA
=
1
tA −
1
(1−tA)
4 + wH
wL+
wH
exL

ex2L
. (26)
This equation shows that country A’s resident population continues to be increasing in
its own marginal tax rate (for tA < 1/2) like in the case where the competing country
was Beveridgean. Consequently, the direction of the migration response to a country’s
tax increase is independent of the other country’s type. However, its magnitude is
larger here than it was under Beveridge-Beveridge competition. This property follows
immediately from the comparison of (26) with (20) which impliesµ
∂bxL
∂tA
¶BEVBIS
>
µ
∂bxL
∂tA
¶BEV BEV
. (27)
Let us now determine the best-replies of each of the countries concentrating on the
case where bxL ≥ 1/2, i.e., some of the poor from the Bismarckian country move to
the Beveridgean country. This is the case one would intuitively anticipate to occur,
and this expectation is confirmed in the numerical examples reported below. To study
government B’s best response we now have to write its objective explicitly (a complica-
tion we have been able to avoid in the symmetric cases above). The specification under
autarky, (6) with ρB = 0, is easily generalized to account for migration and bxL ≥ 1/2.
Rearranging and simplifying this yield
SWFB =
µbxL − 1
2
¶
(CEAL − 1) +
exLZ
1/2
(1− x)dx+ (1− bxL)(CEBL − 1) + 1Z
exL
xdx
+
1
2
(CEBH − 1) +
1Z
1/2
xdx. (28)
The first two terms on the RHS of this expression concerns those poor natives of B
which have moved to country A (i.e., poor individuals with taste parameters in the
range [1/2, bxL]), while the next two terms account for the poor who remain in their
native country B. Finally, there are the two terms representing the utility of the rich
(who do not move, incur no risk and pay no taxes). The derivative of this expression
14
with respect to the tax rate can be decomposed as follows:
∂SWFB
∂tB
=
∂SWFB
∂bxL ∂bxL∂tB + (1− bxL)∂CE
B
L
∂tB
,
where we use the property that CEAL and CE
B
H do not depend on t
B. Observe that
equation (25) implies ∂SWFB/∂bxL = 0; because bxL is by definition indifferent between
both countries of residence, a small change in this marginal individual has no first-order
effect on welfare. Consequently, the first-order condition for tB reduces to
∂CEBL
∂tB
=
∂wL(1− tBL )tBL
∂tB
= 0, (29)
where we have used equations (3) and (24) to express CEBL as a function of t
B. Solving
yields tB = 1/2 irrespectively of the tax of the other country. In other words, providing
full and actuarially fair insurance remains the dominant strategy of the Bismarckian
country and we have tB
BEVBIS
L = 1/2.
Turning to government A, it maximizes its natives expected utility according to
Beveridgean preferences. The problem (for bxL ≥ 1/2) is
SWFA =
1
4
ln
£
wL(1− tA)
¤
+
1
4
ln
∙µ
wL +
wHbxL(tA, tB)
¶
tA
¸
(30)
+
1
2
ln
£
wH(1− tA)
¤
+ 2
0.5Z
0
(1− x)dx, (31)
and the FOC is given by
FBEV BIS =
−0.75
1− tA +
0.25
tA
+ 0.25
wH
wL + wHexL
−∂bxL/∂tAbx2L = 0. (32)
First-order conditions (22) and (32) are too complicated to permit a clear-cut compari-
son between country A’s tax rate under Beveridge-Beveridge and that under Beveridge-
Bismarck competition. With ∂bxL/∂tA > 0, equation (27) then implies that for the same
migration level bxL we have FBEVBIS < FBEVBEV . Consequently, for a given migration
equilibrium (bxL), government A sets a higher tax rate when it is competing with a Bis-
marckian country than when the other country is Beveridgean (t
BEVBIS
> t
BEVBEV
, for
the same bxL). This result suggests that, surprisingly, the Beveridgean country’s social
insurance system could be more generous when it competes with a Bismarckian country
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No Mobility Mobility of the poor Mobility of the rich
Country A BEV BIS BEV BIS BEV BEV BIS BEV
Country B BEV BIS BIS BEV BIS BIS
tA 0.25 0.50 0.219 0.50 0.2224 0.208 0.50 0.2223
tB 0.219 0.50 0.50 0.208 0.50 0.50bxL 0.500 0.50 0.74bxH 0.50 0.50 0.37
SWFAL 0.36 0.13 0.336 0.13 0.26 0.327 0.13 0.28
SWFAH 0.58 0.88 0.598 0.88 0.60 0.605 0.88 0.61
SWFA 0.94 1.00 0.934 1.00 0.86 1.932 1.00 0.89
SWFBL 0.336 0.13 0.14 0.327 0.13 0.13
SWFBH 0.598 0.88 0.88 0.605 0.88 0.88
SWFB 0.934 1.00 1.02 0.932 1.00 1.00
Table 1: Insurance for the poor
than with a Beveridgean country. Put differently, the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax
rates and level of social protection could be less intense under a Beveridge-Bismarck
competition than under a Beveridge-Beveridge competition.
Unfortunately the problem remains too complex to obtain analytical results beyond
this somewhat speculative argument, even with our logarithmic specification. The fol-
lowing two sections present numerical examples to illustrate the conclusions obtained
so far and to obtain some additional results.
5 Numerical examples
We now present numerical examples assuming for the time being {wL, wH} = {1, 2}.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 present the outcome for a Beveridgean and a Bismarckian
country under autarky (no mobility). In accordance with the analytical results, the
Beveridgean government imposes a uniform tax rate of 1/4, while poor residents of a
Bismarckian country face a tax rate of 1/2. Observe that welfare levels among planners
with different preferences are not comparable.
Columns 4—6 present the results for the three types of tax competition when low
income individuals have the possibility to migrate. We can draw the following conclu-
sions. First, migration affects Beveridgean insurance policies only ; Bismarckian coun-
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tries keep offering actuarially fair full insurance. Beveridgean countries, on the other
hand, are forced to reduce their marginal tax rates. Second, the Beveridgean tax is
greater when the other country is Bismarckian planner than when it is Beveridgean
(0.2224 vs. 0.219). This numerical result confirms the conjecture expressed in the ana-
lytical part, that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be more important under
Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Third, a
more significant tax-race-to-the-bottom is not necessarily bad news. The Beveridgean
country attains a higher welfare under the Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under
Beveridge-Bismarck competition, even though the tax rate is lower. This is because
under Beveridge-Bismarck competition the cost of receiving migrants from country B
(poor individuals with a taste parameter x in the range [0.5, 0.74]) is not offset by
a slightly higher marginal tax rate. On the other hand, under Beveridge-Beveridge
competition, the symmetry of the problem ensures no migration flows in equilibrium.
Fourth, competition with a Beveridgean country may increase the welfare of a Bismar-
ckian country, even when the social insurance policy is unchanged. This is because the
low income migrants are better off in the Beveridgean country A (recall that welfare
depends on the natives). All the other low-income individuals (x > 0.74) are as well off
as under autarky. They have the option to move to the other country but for them the
benefit of a Beveridgean insurance policy does not offset the cost of migration (because
the high level of x represents a large degree of attachment to the home country).
So far we have concentrated on case where only the poor face an earnings risk
and are mobile. The last three columns of Table 1 present some results for the case
where the rich are mobile (while the earnings risk continues to be restricted to the
poor). When the high income individuals are mobile, the tax-race-to-the-bottom under
Beveridge-Beveridge competition is more significant than when the poor are mobile.
Consequently, at the no migration equilibrium of the Beveridge-Beveridge competition
low income individuals are worse-off (0.327 in column 7 against 0.336 in column 4)
and high income ones are better-off (0.605 in column 7 against 0.598 in column 4)
under mobility of the rich than under mobility of the poor. However, under Beveridge-
Bismarck competition the mobility of high income individuals generates a higher welfare
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No Mobility Mobility of the poor Mobility of the rich
Country A BEV BIS BEV BIS BEV BEV BIS BEV
Country B BEV BIS BIS BEV BIS BIS
tA 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.445
tB 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500bxL 0.500 0.500 0.594bxH 0.500 0.500 0.417
SWFAL 0.130 0.125 0.130 0.125 0.123 0.130 0.125 0.119
SWFAH 0.303 0.375 0.303 0.375 0.296 0.303 0.375 0.345
SWFA 0.433 0.500 0.433 0.500 0.418 0.433 0.500 0.464
SWFBL 0.130 0.125 0.126 0.130 0.125 0.125
SWFBH 0.303 0.375 0.375 0.303 0.375 0.375
SWFB 0.433 0.500 0.501 0.433 0.500 0.500
Table 2: Insurance for all
for both the Beveridgean country income classes than the mobility of the poor (for the
poor, 0.28 in column 9 against 0.26 in column 6, and for the rich 0.61 in column 9
against 0.60 in column 6). The reason is that when the high income individuals are the
ones mobile, the poor natives of the Bismarckian country cannot migrate towards the
Beveridgean country decreasing its insurance benefit. At the same time, high income
individuals natives of the Beveridgean country can migrate towards the Bismarckian
country and enjoy a higher utility where they are not affected by taxation.
Finally, let us consider the case where rich individuals also face an income risk that
may be insured by social insurance. Table 2 presents the results. We suppose that
all individuals may loose their entire income with probability 1/2 (the same for all).
The Beveridgean country taxes low and high income individuals at the same rate and
provides a flat benefit to all individuals experiencing a loss. The Bismarckian planner
provides actuarially fair full insurance to each income class.
The results show that, with only one exception, there is no tax-race-to-the-bottom,
so that mobility has no impact on social insurance and welfare. The only exception
concerns the Beveridge-Bismarck tax competition. With low income individuals being
mobile, even thought taxes do not decrease, there is migration towards the Beveridgean
country. When instead high income are mobiles, the Beveridgean government is forced
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wL = 1, wH = 3/2 wL = 1, wH = 2 wL = 1, wH = 3
Country A BEV BIS BEV BEV BIS BEV BEV BIS BEV
Country B BEV BIS BIS BEV BIS BIS BEV BIS BIS
tA 0.220 0.50 0.2227 0.219 0.50 0.2224 0.217 0.50 0.2225
tB 0.220 0.50 0.50 0.219 0.50 0.50 0.217 0.50 0.500bxL 0.500 0.50 0.70 0.500 0.50 0.74 0.500 0.50 0.798bxH
SWFAL 0.281 0.125 0.22 0.336 0.13 0.26 0.419 0.125 0.326
SWFAH 0.454 0.625 0.45 0.598 0.88 0.60 0.802 1.375 0.798
SWFA 0.734 0.750 0.68 0.934 1.00 0.86 1.220 1.500 1.125
SWFBL 0.281 0.125 0.13 0.336 0.13 0.14 0.419 0.125 0.158
SWFBH 0.454 0.625 0.63 0.598 0.88 0.88 0.802 1.375 1.375
SWFB 0.734 0.750 0.76 0.934 1.00 1.02 1.220 1.500 1.533
Table 3: Effect of varying income inequality. Insurance for the poor, mobility of the
poor
to lower the tax from 0.5 to 0.445 to avoid a greater migration towards the Bismarckian
country. Nevertheless, the Beveridgean country attains its highest level of welfare when
it competes with a Bismarckian country and when high income individuals are mobile.
Of notice that all the identified effects are robust to income inequality variation. To
avoid tedious exposition, Table 3 presents the results just for the case where only the
poor risk to loose their income and enjoy mobility. We normalize low income to 1 and
let the high income take the values 3/2, 2 and 3. What should be remarked from Table
3 is that in the Beveridge-Beveridge competition the tax-race-to-the-bottom is more
important the higher the income inequality, just as predicted in our analytical analyses in
Section 4.2. Additionally, in a Beveridge-Bismarck competition, as expected migration
towards the Beveridgean country increases with income inequality even though the effect
on the Beveridgean country taxation is not monotonic.
6 Choice of the system
Up to this point, we have assumed that social preferences and type of system go hand
in hand. We shall now explicitly separate governments’ preferences from the type of
system. Under autarky, such a separation is of course not very relevant. When there is
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no mobility it is plain that a Beveridgean government will prefer a Beveridgean social
insurance system over a Bismarckian one. Similarly, a Bismarckian government would
never opt for a Beveridgean system. When there is competition, the choice of the system
may in itself be part of a government’s strategy. The question is if a government of a
given type may find it beneficial to adopt a system of the other type for strategic reasons
(i.e., considering the tax competition game to be played with the other country). Our
analysis is purely illustrative and we make use of a numerical example developed in the
previous section. Formally, we add a stage to the game where governments decide which
type of system to adopt. This decision is made (simultaneously) by both governments
before tax competition game considered in the previous section is played, and there is
full commitment. We focus on the case where only the poor face an income risk and are
mobile. Table 4 describes the four possible games that may be played, depending on the
type of governments. Governments can have either Bismarckian or Beveridgean type of
preferences and implement either a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean insurance policy. To
be more precise, governments can both have Beveridgean preferences (Sub-game1, on
the top-left), one government can have Beveridgean preferences while the other has a
Bismarckian objective (Sub-game2 and Sub-game3, top-right and bottom left). Finally,
they can both have Bismarckian preferences (Sub-game4, bottom right).
Our results suggest that when both governments have identical preferences, they
choose the social insurance system associated with their type. A more interesting and
surprising outcome emerges in the asymmetric case where one government has Bev-
eridgean preferences and the other Bismarckian ones. In this case the Nash equilibrium
implies that both players choose a Beveridgean insurance policy. Table 5 presents the
detailed results for the case in which government A has Beveridgean type of preferences
and government B Bismarckian ones. Since for country A the choice of a Beveridgean
policy is a dominant strategy we only highlight the choice for country B between a
Beveridgean or a Bismarckian policy. It shows that government B finds it optimal to
adopt a Beveridgean insurance policy with a low tax (of 11% as opposed to the 22.5%
tax in country A), even if harming his own rich natives. Facing such Beveridgean policy,
the best response of government A is to increase slightly the tax with respect to the
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BEV B BIS B
BEV BIS BEV BIS
BEV 0.934, 0.934 0.860, 0.806 0.906, 1.019 1.015, 1.016
BEV A
BIS 0.860, 0.806 0.750, 0.750 0.900, 0.103 0.750, 1.000
BEV 1.019, 0.906 0.103, 0.900 0.994, 0.994 0.961, 1.000
BIS A
BIS 1.016, 1.015 1.000, 0.750 1.002, 0.961 1.000, 1.000
Table 4: Welfare levels (SWFA, SWFB) achieved under strategic choice of the type of
system, given government’s preferences. For instance, BEV A represents the case where
the government of Country A has Beveridgean preferences and can adopt a Beveridgean
system (first row) or a Bismarckian system (second row). Similarly, BIS B represents the
case where the government of Country B is Bismarckian and can choose a Beveridgean
system (third row) or a Bismarckian system (fourth row).
tax when competing with a Bismarckian policy (22.5% vs 22.2%). Indeed, since the
threat of migration is not as strong as under competition with a Bismarckian policy,
government A can afford the tax increase. Notice that for government A the equilib-
rium resulting from such change in government B type of policy constitutes a Pareto
improvement.
7 Conclusion
We have studied the impact of costly labor mobility and social insurance systems. We
have considered a two-country setting where countries choose simultaneously and non-
cooperatively the payroll tax rate (which determines the generosity of the system). We
have analyzed three scenarios: both governments provide Bismarck-type of insurance,
both governments provide Beveridge-type of insurance, and one government provides
a Beveridge-type of insurance and the other a Bismarck one. We have shown that a
Bismarckian insurance policy is not affected by migration but that the Beveridgean one
is. Moreover, our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be
more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck
competition. Nevertheless, the Beveridgean country attains a higher welfare under
the Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. We
have also considered the strategic choice of the type of the system and illustrated that,
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Type of policy implemented
by each government
Government A
Beveridgean preferences BEV BEV
Government B
Bismarkian preferences BEV BIS
tA 0.225 0.222
tB 0.579 0.736
XL 0.110 0.500
SWFAL 0.312 0.265
SWFAH 0.594 0.596
SWFA 0.906 0.860
SWFBL 0.255 0.141
SWFBH 0.765 0.875
SWFB 1.019 1.015
Table 5: Beveridge Beverdige tax competition versus Beveridge Bismark tax competi-
tion, when Government A has Beverigean type of preferences and Government B has
Bismarkian ones. Insurance of the poor, mobility of the poor.
when in competition to Beveridgean governments, Bismarckian governments may find
it beneficially to adopt a Beveridgean policy.
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